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CURSED BELIEFS WITH COMMON-VALUE PUBLIC GOODS†
CALEB A. COX*
ABSTRACT. I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-
contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I
consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium,
provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naïve players
who condition expectations only on their private information contribute too
little, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experi-
ment, subjects indeed under-contribute relative to equilibrium. Using mod-
ified games with different belief conditioning effects, I verify that under-
contribution is due to improper belief conditioning. I find little evidence of
learning over multiple rounds of play.
Keywords: Public goods, experiments, cursed equilibrium, game theory
I INTRODUCTION
The under-provision of public goods is a central problem in economics. Re-
search on public goods has primarily focused on incentives to free-ride and
various mechanisms for overcoming these incentives. In this paper, I demon-
strate another force that may drive under-contribution and under-provision,
even in the absence of free-riding. In public goods environments with common
or interdependent values, individuals may fail to correctly condition their be-
liefs about the uncertain value of a public good. Many public goods in the
real world may have substantial common-value components, such as uncer-
tain quality. Real-world public goods such as pollution abatement, national
Date: January 21, 2014.
†The author thanks Paul J. Healy, Matthew Jones, Yaron Azrieli, John Kagel, Dan Levin,
James Peck, Lucas Coffman, Katie Baldiga, Daeho Kim, David Blau, Semin Kim, Xi Qu,
Greg Howard, Kerry Tan, Alan Horn, Michael Caldara, and Dimitry Mezhvinsky for helpful
comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. This
research was funded in part by National Science Foundation grant #SES-0847406 (Paul J.
Healy, P.I.) and in part by the JMCB Grants for Graduate Student Research Program.
∗Dept. of Economics and Finance, Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane,
Durham DH1 3LB, UK; caleb.cox@durham.ac.uk.
1
2 CALEB A. COX
defense, police protection, and flood control may be of uncertain value, and
information about the value may be decentralized. Individual contributors to
such public goods should condition their beliefs about value on not only their
private information, but also the information implicit in the strategic contri-
bution choices of others. Failure to do so may lead to incorrect expectations
about the value of the public good.
To isolate the belief conditioning effect of interest, I consider a simple case
of a binary, excludable public good (or club good), such as a toll road, private
park, or gated community. Consider, for example, the choice of whether to
contribute to a new recreation center of uncertain quality. If the use of the
center is not tied to contribution, there is an incentive to free-ride. Instead,
suppose that contribution takes the form of purchasing a membership, with
non-members excluded. In order for the center to be viable, some minimum
threshold of contributing members must be reached, otherwise contributions
are refunded. Each individual privately observes a signal correlated with the
quality or value of the center, and then all individuals simultaneously de-
cide whether to purchase memberships. Any given individual should consider
two possible cases: the minimum threshold of members is either reached or
it is not. If the threshold is not reached, her decision to contribute is incon-
sequential, as her money will be refunded. Thus, she should condition her
expectations on the event that the threshold is reached. However, this event
contains useful information about the quality of the center, since in equilib-
rium it implies that other contributors observed relatively favorable signals
of quality. Thus, an individual who correctly conditions her beliefs on this
event should expect the quality to be higher than she would conditional on
her private signal alone. Failure to properly condition beliefs would lead to
under-contribution and under-provision relative to equilibrium.
Beyond the public goods context, similar effects could arise with joint ven-
tures in which several potential partners have noisy information about the
profitability of the venture and must choose whether to participate. Naïve
beliefs that fail to account for the information content of others’ behavior in
these contexts may cause potential partners to under-value the joint venture,
thus leading to coordination failure. Thus, the results of this paper may yield
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insights into a number of applications within industrial organization as well
as public economics.
I develop a simple model of excludable public goods with interdependent
values and compare the predictions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium with naïve
strategies, formalized by the cursed equilibrium model of Eyster and Rabin
(2005). In their model, agents believe that with some probability, others ig-
nore their private information and choose an action according to the (equi-
librium) ex ante distribution of actions. Thus, each agent’s belief about the
distribution of actions chosen by others is correct, but agents do not fully ac-
count for the link between others’ actions and their private information. I
show that cursed beliefs lead to under-contribution relative to Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, including the possibility of zero contribution for some parameter
values.
Testing these predictions in the field would be problematic, since individ-
uals’ private information is unobservable. Therefore, I design a laboratory
experiment to test whether improper conditioning of beliefs leads to under-
contribution. The main treatment (the common-value threshold game) has
5 players in a group, with a threshold of 4 contributors required for provi-
sion. I vary the cost of contribution to determine whether contribution levels
conform to Bayesian Nash equilibrium or naïve strategies for high, low, and
intermediate costs. Rather than closely mimicking any particular real-world
application, the experiment is designed to create a stark separation between
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and (fully) cursed equilibrium predictions to
examine the degree to which subjects (fail to) properly condition beliefs in
making contribution choices.
Improper belief conditioning has been previously observed in other con-
texts, most famously in the winner’s curse in common-value auctions. In
common-value auctions, bidders should update their belief about value down-
ward conditional on winning, while in my context, contributors should update
their belief about value upward conditional on provision. In order to compare
the results of the main treatment to the more well-known winner’s curse in
common-value auctions, I consider an “anti-threshold” game with the same
environment, except that the public good is provided to contributors if and
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only if no more than 2 players contribute. The anti-threshold game is analo-
gous to a simple common-value, two-unit auction with restricted bids and no
trade in the case of excess demand. This treatment allows for comparison of
behavioral responses to favorable and unfavorable belief conditioning effects,
as well as comparison of how subjects learn to account for these effects over
several rounds of play.
Sources of error other than improper conditioning of beliefs might drive
behavior away from equilibrium. To isolate the effect of belief conditioning,
I consider a treatment with uncertain private values. Each subject has an
uncertain private value for the excludable public good and observes a signal
correlated with this value. Unlike the common-value case, an individual sub-
ject’s value is uncorrelated with others players’ signals, and thus no subject
has information about the value of the public good to others. Play proceeds
just as in the main treatment. In this case, the symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium strategy precisely corresponds to the naïve (or fully-cursed) strat-
egy from the common-value threshold game. Thus, if subjects are naïve, there
should be no difference in behavior between these treatments, while correct
conditioning of beliefs should lead to considerably higher contribution in the
common-value setting than the uncertain private-values setting.
The experimental results show substantial under-contribution and under-
provision in the main treatment. Despite sharp differences in the Bayesian
Nash equilibria of the games with favorable, unfavorable, and no belief con-
ditioning effects, actual behavior is quite similar between games, and in fact
indistinguishable between the main treatment and the uncertain private val-
ues treatment. Furthermore, very little learning is observed. Thus, the re-
sults suggest that subjects completely fail to condition their beliefs in the
proper direction, leading to under-contribution. While fully-cursed equilib-
rium succeeds in predicting this similarity between treatments, it does not
predict contribution levels very accurately.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explores the related litera-
ture. Section III describes the model and theoretical predictions. Section IV
details the experimental procedures. Section V shows the results. Section VI
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concludes with a discussion of the key findings. Appendices A and B contain
proofs and experimental instructions, respectively.
II RELATED LITERATURE
Many previous experiments consider non-excludable, step-level public goods
and provision points, including Van de Kragt et al. (1983), Dawes et al. (1986),
Isaac et al. (1989), Marks and Croson (1999), and Croson and Marks (2000).
Provision point or threshold mechanisms have been generally successful in
such environments under complete information or private values. Several
experiments, such as Croson et al. (2006), Kocher et al. (2005), Swope (2002),
and Bchir and Willinger (2013) find that excludability tends to increase contri-
butions in a variety of linear and step-level public goods environments, while
Czap et al. (2010) find higher contributions to non-excludable projects. Gail-
mard and Palfrey (2005) compare alternative cost-sharing mechanisms for ex-
cludable public goods and find that a voluntary cost-sharing mechanism with
proportional rebates performs best.
To my knowledge, the only prior consideration of interdependent-value
public goods (excludable or non-excludable) is in the literature on leading by
example, beginning with Hermalin (1998), and expanded to charitable giving
by Vesterlund (2003), Potters et al. (2005), Andreoni (2006), and Potters et al.
(2007). Unlike my symmetric, simultaneous-move setting, this literature ex-
amines informed and uninformed players moving sequentially, which is likely
to make the information content of the leader’s action relatively transparent
compared to simultaneous-move games. Indeed, uninformed second-movers
do respond the the information contained in the contribution choices of in-
formed first-movers in this environment.
This paper contributes to the public goods literature by showing how naïve
beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with com-
mon or interdependent values, even when free-riding incentives are absent.
This effect is conceptually related the winner’s curse in common-value auc-
tions (Thaler 1988, Kagel 1995, Kagel and Levin 2002). In these environ-
ments, the bidder with the highest value estimate tends to win the auction,
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but because her estimate was the highest, it tends to be higher than the true
value. In Bayesian Nash equilibrium, rational agents account for this ad-
verse selection effect and condition their value expectations on winning the
auction. However, in many experiments such as Kagel and Levin (1986) and
Levin et al. (1996), subjects fail to properly condition beliefs, leading to over-
bidding and low or negative profits. In my setting, similar naïvety causes
subjects to choose not to contribute, even when their signals are high enough
that contributing is optimal.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on strategic voting in
common-value environments. Seminal theoretical analysis of such environ-
ments by Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1998) examines the behav-
ior of strategic voters who condition their beliefs on being pivotal. Experi-
ments including Guarnaschelli et al. (2000), Ali et al. (2008), Battaglini et al.
(2008), Battaglini et al. (2010), and Esponda and Vespa (2013) find evidence
that laboratory subjects sometimes behave strategically, though their behav-
ior is not always explained well by symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
I am also concerned with comparing behavior and learning under favor-
able and unfavorable belief conditioning effects. Holt and Sherman (1994)
compared these effects in the context of a takeover game. They found evi-
dence of a “loser’s curse” as well as a winner’s curse, with subjects behaving
naïvely in both environments.
The concept of naïve behavior in common-value auctions, strategic vot-
ing, takeover games, and related environments is formalized by the cursed-
equilibrium model of Eyster and Rabin (2005). I will employ Eyster and Ra-
bin’s cursed equilibrium model as an alternative prediction to Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and discuss the extent to which this model can explain the exper-
imental data.
III THEORY
I first give the basic definitions and assumptions. The set of agents is N =
{1, ...,n}, where n ≥ 2. I will use i and j to denote typical agents in N. Each
agent observes a private signal xi, which is a realization of a random variable
X i. The private signals are iid with probability density function f : [x, x]→
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ℜ+, which is assumed to be continuous and strictly positive everywhere on
the interval [x, x], where 0≤ x < x <∞. Let F : [x, x]→ [0,1] denote the corre-
sponding cumulative distribution function and X denote an arbitrary random
variable distributed according to F.
There is a binary excludable public good, and its uncertain value to agent
i is vi, given by:
vi =αxi+ 1−αn−1
∑
j 6=i
x j, (1)
where α ∈ [ 1n ,1]. The case of α= 1n corresponds to pure common value, where
the value of the public good to all agents is the arithmetic mean of the private
signals. The case of α= 1 corresponds to pure private values.
The agents observe their private signals and then simultaneously choose
whether or not to contribute an exogenous amount w ∈ (x, x) toward provision
of the public good. Denote the contribution decision of agent i given the sig-
nal xi as ci(xi), where ci(xi)= 1 indicates contribution and ci(xi)= 0 indicates
non-contribution. The public good is provided if at least k ∈ {2, ...,n} agents
contribute, otherwise contributions are refunded and no public good is pro-
vided. Any agent who does not contribute is excluded and gets a utility of
zero. Contributors to the public good get a utility of vi−w if the public good is
provided, and zero otherwise. All agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
I consider symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE), so that in equilib-
rium, ci ≡ c for each agent i. That is, all agents have identical contribution
decision functions. Lemma 1 shows that all such BNE involve “cutoff” strate-
gies.
Lemma 1. In any symmetric BNE, there exists x∗ ∈ ℜ such that each agent
i ∈N strictly prefers to contribute to the public good if and only if xi > x∗.
All proofs are contained in Appendix A. Intuitively, Lemma 1 holds be-
cause in symmetric BNE, each agent’s expected utility of contributing is non-
decreasing in the private signal, and strictly increasing when others con-
tribute with positive probability.
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Lemma 2 establishes that, conditional on at least k−1 others contribut-
ing, agent i’s expectation of the mean signal of the other n−1 agents is non-
decreasing in the cutoff x∗.
Lemma 2. Let the function G i(x∗) be given by:
G i(x∗)=E
[
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i
X j
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c∗(X j)≥ k−1
]
, (2)
where:
c∗(X j)=
{
1 : X j ≥ x∗
0 : X j < x∗.
(3)
Then G i(x∗) is non-decreasing in x∗.
The result in Lemma 2 simply means that the expectation of the mean sig-
nal of the agents other than i conditional on at least k−1 others contributing
is higher than the unconditional expectation, and this conditional expectation
is non-decreasing in the cutoff. This result will be useful in proving the first
Proposition.
In symmetric BNE, conditional on observing a signal xi = x∗, agent i must
be indifferent between contributing and not contributing. Thus,
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1
l
)
(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
(
αx∗+ (1−α)ln−1 E[X |X ≥ x∗]+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1 E[X |X < x∗]−w
)
= 0. (4)
Clearly, x∗ = x is a solution, so non-contribution by all agents is a sym-
metric BNE.1 Proposition 1 gives conditions for the existence of an interior
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a symmetric BNE cutoff x∗ ∈ (x, x) if and only if:
αx+ (1−α)E[X ]<w<
(
α+ (1−α)(k−1)
n−1
)
x+ (1−α)(n−k)
n−1 E[X ] (5)
Moreover, there is at most one such interior symmetric BNE cutoff.
The key to Proposition 1 is to consider agent i’s expected utility of con-
tributing, given a signal of x∗ and conditional on the public good being pro-
vided, treated as a function of the cutoff x∗. If w is within the given bounds,
1In some cases, this trivial equilibrium may be weakly dominated. If w < αx then agent i
prefers to contribute conditional on observing xi >w/α.
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this function crosses zero somewhere in the interval (x, x). Lemma 2 implies
that this function is also strictly increasing in the cutoff, guaranteeing unique-
ness of the interior equilibrium cutoff.
Corollary 1 gives comparative static predictions for changes in the cost of
contribution and the provision threshold.
Corollary 1. Any symmetric BNE cutoff x∗ ∈ (x, x) is increasing in w and
decreasing in k.
Intuitively, a higher cost of contribution makes agents less willing to con-
tribute. A higher provision threshold strengthens the favorable belief condi-
tioning effect, increasing willingness to contribute.2
Cursed Equilibrium
In (symmetric) χ-cursed equilibrium, agents fail to fully account for the con-
nection between the actions of other agents and their private information.
Each agent i ∈ N believes that with probability χ, any given other agent j
contributes with ex ante equilibrium probability regardless of j’s signal.
Denote the χ-cursed equilibrium cutoff by x∗χ. Proposition 2 establishes a
simple condition under which a symmetric interior χ-cursed equilibrium exits
and gives a simple explicit solution for the cutoff in fully-cursed equilibrium,
where χ= 1.
Proposition 2. There exists a symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium cutoff x∗χ ∈
(x, x) if and only if:
αx+ (1−α)E[X ]<w<
(
α+ (1−χ)(1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+
(
χ(1−α)(k−1)
n−1 + (1−α)(n−k)n−1
)
E[X ] (6)
Moreover, there is at most one such interior symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium
cutoff. Finally, for χ = 1, if there exists an interior symmetric fully-cursed
equilibrium cutoff, denoted by x∗1 , then it is given by:
x∗1 =
w
α
− 1−α
α
E[X ] (7)
2This comparative static prediction is not experimentally tested here. However, it guides the
experimental design, as choosing k large relative to n increases the strength of the favorable
belief conditioning effect and thus separation between symmetric BNE cutoffs and cursed
cutoffs.
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The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Straight-
forward manipulation of the expression for the fully-cursed equilibrium cutoff
reveals the intuitive interpretation: given a signal equal to the cutoff, the cost
of contributing must equal the (naïve) expected benefit (neglecting favorable
conditioning).
Corollary 2 establishes that in symmetric cursed equilibrium, agents under-
contribute relative to symmetric BNE, and gives comparative statics predic-
tions for the cursed equilibrium cutoff.
Corollary 2. The interior symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium cutoff x∗χ is non-
decreasing in χ, increasing in w, and decreasing in k. In particular, x∗χ ∈
[x∗, x∗1 ].
Neglect of the favorable conditioning effect causes agent i’s expectation of
vi to be too low, which reduces willingness to contribute. The greater the
degree of cursedness (χ), the greater the severity of under-contribution.
Finally, Corollary 3 shows that, for some parameter values, under-contribution
in cursed equilibrium may be complete.
Corollary 3. If α< 1 and(
α+ (1−χ)(1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+
(
χ(1−α)(k−1)
n−1 + (1−α)(n−k)n−1
)
E[X ]
≤w<
(
α+ (1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+ (1−α)(n−k)n−1 E[X ],
(8)
then there is a symmetric BNE such that each agent contributes with positive
probability, but in symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium contribution occurs with
probability zero.
Intuitively, symmetric BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium coincide in the
case of pure private values, where other agents’ information does not affect
agent i’s expected utility of contributing conditional on the public good being
provided. However, when values are interdependent, for some range of w
contribution breaks down completely in χ-cursed equilibrium because agents
ignore favorable conditioning in forming their expectations.
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Experimental Special Case
In the common-value threshold game (CVT) treatment, I consider a special
case of the threshold game with n= 5, k= 4, α= 15 , and private signals that are
uniformly distributed on [0,100], with w varying across rounds of play. Since
α= 1n , this special case is one of pure common value. The pure common value
case is used in the experiment because it puts the most weight on the private
signals of others and thus gives the greatest contrast between symmetric BNE
and fully-cursed equilibrium. Henceforth I will omit the word “symmetric,”
since symmetric equilibria are the focus of the paper.
Figure I shows the cutoff signals in BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium for
different values of w in the interval [0,100]. The fully-cursed equilibrium
cutoff lies (weakly) above the BNE cutoff for all values of w. That is, the fully-
cursed strategy contributes less often than the BNE strategy. Furthermore,
Figure I. Threshold game cutoff signals in BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium
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as in Corollary 3, whenever 60≤w< 90, contribution breaks down completely
in fully-cursed equilibrium.
It is possible that risk aversion might lead to under-contribution relative
to the risk-neutral BNE prediction, and thus it is important to check the ro-
bustness of the equilibrium prediction. Allowing for risk aversion makes ana-
lytical study of the model much less tractable, but approximate solutions can
be found numerically. I use a constant relative risk aversion utility function
of the form u(y) = y1−r1−r and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of r = 0.67.3
BNE cutoffs change very little with risk aversion, rising only by 1-2 percent-
age points compared to the risk-neutral prediction. Fully-cursed equilibrium
cutoffs rise slightly more. Thus, cutoffs exceeding the BNE prediction by mag-
nitudes shown in the fully-cursed equilibrium prediction could not be alterna-
tively explained by plausible risk aversion. Furthermore, the presence of risk
aversion does not affect the predicted treatment effects between CVT and the
related games of interest.
Anti-Threshold Game with Unfavorable Belief Conditioning
To compare the favorable conditioning effects in the threshold game to simi-
lar unfavorable conditioning effects, I consider an “anti-threshold” (AT) treat-
ment. The environment in the anti-threshold game is the same as in the
common-value threshold game, except that the public good is provided if and
only if no more than m agents contribute. If more then m contribute, the pub-
lic good is not provided and contributions are refunded. The general case of
the anti-threshold game is of less interest than the threshold game, so much
of the theoretical analysis of the anti-threshold game is omitted. However, the
equation characterizing the BNE cutoff is:
m−1∑
l=0
(n−1
l
)
(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
(
αx∗+ (1−α)ln−1 E[X |X ≥ x∗]+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1 E[X |X < x∗]−w
)
= 0 (9)
Notice that x∗ = 0 (all agents contributing for all signals) is always a BNE.
Under parameter conditions similar to those in the previous section, interior
BNE exist as well. The key difference from the threshold game is that in
3This level of risk aversion has been found to be typical of laboratory subjects by Holt and
Laury (2002).
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the anti-threshold game, the public good being provided is bad news about its
value, while in the threshold game it is good news.
In the AT treatment, I consider the special case of n = 5, m = 2, α = 15 ,
and private signals uniformly distributed on [0,100], with w varying across
rounds of play. Figure II shows the cutoff signals for the anti-threshold game
in BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium for varying w. Notice that cutoffs in
fully-cursed equilibrium are exactly the same as those from CVT. However, in
AT, fully-cursed agents over-contribute relative to BNE.
There is a simple symmetry between the AT and CVT. Fixing δ ∈ [−50,50],
the absolute difference between the BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium cutoffs
in CVT with w = 50+δ is equal to the absolute difference between BNE and
fully-cursed equilibrium cutoffs in the anti-threshold game with w = 50−δ.
Figure II. Anti-threshold game cutoff signals in BNE and fully-cursed equilibrium
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Thus, the belief conditioning effects in CVT and AT are in this sense compa-
rable in magnitude, but opposite in direction.
Private-Value Threshold Game with No Belief Conditioning Effect
In the private-value threshold game (PVT) treatment I consider a game sim-
ilar to that in CVT, except that each agent’s value for the public good is the
mean of five agent-specific iid random draws. One of the five is observed by
the agent, while the other four are not observed by anyone. Thus, the ex ante
marginal distribution of each agent’s value is the same as in CVT, but there is
no conditioning effect. In fact, the symmetric fully-cursed equilibrium in CVT
is identical to the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in PVT. Thus, by
comparing contributions between PVT and CVT, the effect of favorable belief
conditioning CVT can be observed.
IV EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
To avoid negative payoffs, the cost of contributing is implicit, so that each par-
ticipant is faced with a choice between a certain payoff of w and an uncertain
payoff of v.4 The conversion rate is $0.20 for each experimental currency unit
(or “token”), so that the maximum possible earnings are $20 per person. Par-
ticipants also received a $5 show-up fee. Subjects gave consent to access aca-
demic records including Grade Point Average, ACT/SAT scores, and academic
major. This information is used to test whether behavior in the experiment is
correlated with cognitive or quantitative ability.
There are two treatment variables. The first, varied between subjects, is
the game: common-value threshold (CVT), anti-threshold (AT), and private-
value threshold (PVT). Only one of the three games appeared in any given
session. The second treatment variable, varied within subject, is the cost of
contributing: 35, 45, 55, and 65 experimental currency units, with each value
repeated five times in randomized order. Each session had twenty rounds, one
4Framing in terms of explicit rather than implicit costs might affect behavior and learning
(Lind and Plott, 1991). However, in the treatment of primary interest (CVT), the experience
from which subjects are expected to learn not to under-contribute is the failure to realize
profitable public goods, which is inherently implicit.
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of which was selected randomly for payment. Each session included twenty
participants who were randomly assigned to groups of five at the start of each
round (stranger matching).
In each round, each participant observed the cost of contributing and her
own private signal. Contribution choices were then made simultaneously. At
the end of each round, all participants observed the signals and choices of the
other four group members (ordered from highest to lowest), the value of the
public good and whether it was provided, and their own earnings in tokens
for the round.5
The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were run in the experimental economics
laboratory at The Ohio State University. Seven sessions were run (3 CVT,
2 AT, and 2 PVT), each with 20 subjects.6 Participants earned approximately
$15.50 on average, and each session lasted about 45 minutes.
V RESULTS
To organize the results, I first summarize the key hypotheses to be tested. The
main hypotheses come from the predictions of cursed equilibrium compared
to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Hypothesis 1 (Contribution within Games). Under full or partial cursedness,
subjects will choose to allocate tokens to the group project too little in CVT and
too much in AT, relative to BNE.
Hypothesis 2 (Contribution between Games). Under full cursedness, sub-
jects will choose to allocate tokens to the group project with the same fre-
quency in CVT, PVT, and AT.
5The signals and choices of other group members were displayed in decreasing order by signal
to make it easier to notice any correlation between signals and choices.
6Due to a recruitment system error, two subjects were mistakenly allowed to participate a
second time. The choices made by each of these subjects in their second session of participa-
tion have been excluded from the analysis.
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Hypothesis 1 comes from the neglect of belief conditioning in CVT and AT
under full or partial cursedness. Hypothesis 2 comes from the fact that the
fully-cursed equilibrium cutoffs in CVT, PVT, and AT are identical.7
Secondary hypotheses of interest are concerned with learning over multi-
ple rounds of play and individual heterogeneity. I will investigate whether
subjects learn to play closer to BNE and whether learning effects differ be-
tween games. I will also examine whether individuals with greater cognitive
or quantitative ability play strategies closer to BNE.
Hypothesis 3 (Learning to Play BNE). If subjects learn to recognize favor-
able and unfavorable belief conditioning effects, their allocation decisions should
move toward BNE after several rounds of play in both CVT and AT.
Hypothesis 4 (Individual Heterogeneity and Cognitive/Quantitative Ability).
Greater cognitive and quantitative ability will be positively correlated with
proper belief conditioning.
Aggregate Results
Aggregate rates of allocation to the private account are summarized in Figure
III. It is evident that aggregate under-contribution occurs in CVT, though not
to the degree predicted by fully-cursed equilibrium for the higher cost levels
where the difference is greatest. It is also clear that subjects choose the group
project too frequently in AT relative to BNE, though the frequencies are not
close to the fully-cursed equilibrium predictions either.
Notice that contribution rates in CVT and PVT are virtually the same for
all cost levels.8 I find no statistical difference between CVT and PVT for any
cost level using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests with subject-level average con-
tribution as the unit of observation. Contribution rates in AT are somewhat
lower, though the difference is much less stark than predicted under BNE.
Overall, the similarity of contribution rates across games is consistent with
full or nearly-full cursedness. However, the contribution rates within each
7There is no distinction between cursed equilibrium and BNE in PVT, due to the absence of
belief conditioning effects.
8Even where the difference is greatest (the higher cost levels) it is in the opposite direction
predicted by BNE, with slightly less contribution in CVT than in PVT.
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Figure III. Aggregate rates of non-contribution (choosing the private account)
game are not particularly close to the fully-cursed predictions. Moreover, it is
clear that cursedness does not explain the data completely, because contribu-
tion levels in PVT differ substantially from the (identical) predictions of BNE
and cursed equilibrium. This result highlights to importance of studying be-
lief conditioning by comparing the CVT and PVT treatments rather than only
comparing the data to theoretical benchmarks within one treatment. Later, I
will explore possible explanations for the contribution levels in PVT.
In addition to contribution decisions, efficiency in CVT is of interest. Figure
IV shows the average per person net gains in CVT for each cost of contribu-
tion. The first-best efficiency benchmark shows the net gain if provision occurs
if and only if provision is efficient. The second-best benchmark shows the net
gain if a benevolent social planner were to enforce a symmetric contribution
cutoff to maximize the expected total surplus. While efficiency under BNE is
somewhat lower than second-best, it is quite close. However, the efficiency in
the data falls well below even the BNE benchmark, particularly for cost levels
45 and 55. Overall, there is a loss of approximately 65% of the average net
gains from the public good that could have been realized in BNE.
While the rates of choosing the private account may provide a rough esti-
mate of the average cutoff subjects use, a more appealing method is maximum
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Figure IV. Efficiency in CVT
likelihood, similar to the method of El-Gamal and Grether (1995). Under the
assumption that all subjects use the same cutoff (but may make errors), I es-
timate the cutoff for each game and cost level by checking all possible cutoffs
and finding the one that explains the most data, or equivalently, minimizes
the number of errors. I assume that with probability 1− ², an agent makes a
contribution choice consistent with the hypothesized cutoff, and with probabil-
ity ² (the error rate), she makes the opposite choice. The maximum likelihood
cutoff is the cutoff that minimizes the observed error rate.
Figure V shows maximum-likelihood cutoffs with 95% bootstrap confidence
intervals. Once again, the estimated cutoffs suggest under-contribution in
CVT and over-contribution in AT relative to BNE. It is also clear that esti-
mated cutoffs are very similar between CVT and PVT. I find no signficant
differences between the CVT and PVT cutoffs for any cost level using boot-
strap hypothesis tests.9 This similarity further suggests that subjects treat
9These tests are not meant to be interpreted as independent of the previous tests comparing
contribution rates, but together to they give a clearer description of the similarity between
the CVT and PVT data.
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Figure V. Maximum Likelihood Cutoffs
Figure VI. Empirical Best Responses
the CVT and PVT games as equivalent, despite the substantial differences
between their BNE.
While behavior does not appear to be consistent with BNE, it is also of
interest how closely behavior approximates an empirical best response. Fig-
ure VI compares maximum likelihood cutoffs with empirical best response
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cutoffs. Empirical best response cutoffs can be easily computed from equa-
tion 1 using the empirical probability of contribution to the group project,
average signal conditional on contribution, and average signal conditional on
non-contribution. Maximum likelihood cutoffs are generally not very close to
empirical best response cutoffs where the cutoffs are interior, with the excep-
tion of CVT with w = 65.10 Thus, neither BNE, nor fully-cursed equilibrium,
nor empirical best response appears to explain the aggregate data well.
Assuming some partially-cursed equilibrium holds across all rounds and
all cost levels, the cursedness parameter χ can be estimated by maximum
likelihood for CVT and AT.11 For CVT, the maximum likelihood estimate of
the cursedness parameter is 0.60, with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of
[0.58, 0.76]. In fact, the 0.6-cursed equilibrium cutoffs are quite close to the
previous (unrestricted) maximum likelihood cutoffs estimates for CVT.
For AT, the maximum likelihood estimate of the cursedness parameter is
0.91, higher than in CVT, but with a wide 95% bootstrap confidence interval of
[0.51, 1.00]. Furthermore, the 0.91-cursed equilibrium cutoffs are not particu-
larly close to the unrestricted maximum likelihood cutoff estimates, since for
cost levels 45 and 55 the unrestricted estimates do not fall between the BNE
and fully-cursed equilibrium cutoffs. The data in AT are somewhat noiser
than in the other games, perhaps due to the less intuitive nature of the game.
The following main results summarize the key findings from the aggregate
data.
Result 1 (Contribution within Games). Relative to BNE, subjects allocate
tokens to the group project too infrequently in CVT and too frequently in AT.
Subjects also over-contribute in PVT with cost levels of 55 and 65, which is
not predicted by cursedness.
10Empirical best response cutoffs may be either higher or lower than BNE cutoffs, depending
on behavior. Using a cutoff above the BNE cutoff tends to drive the empirical best response
cutoff downward in CVT, since the favorable conditioning effect is strengthened. However,
the opposite type of “mistake” (contributing when the signal is too low) has the opposite effect
on the empirical best response cutoff.
11This estimation follows the same approach of selecting cutoffs to minimize errors as pre-
viously discussed. However, I add the restriction that cutoffs for each of the four cost levels
within a game (CVT or AT) must be consistent with some partially-cursed equilibrium cutoff.
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Result 2 (Contribution between Games). Contribution choices in CVT and
PVT are indistinguishable. Contribution choices in AT differ from those in
the other games, but this difference is much smaller than predicted in BNE.
Repeated Trials and Learning
Before interpreting the aggregate results, I examine behavior and learning
over multiple rounds of play graphically and using logistic regression analy-
sis. Recall that each of the four cost levels was encountered five times in each
session, with the order randomized for each session.
Figure VII. Contribution Rates Over Repeated Trials
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Figure VII shows contribution rates over repeated trials of each of the four
cost levels and for each of CVT, PVT, and AT. The BNE and fully-cursed bench-
marks represent the expected contribution rates under each equilibrium con-
cept, given the signals realized in the experiment. Few clear trends are ap-
parent. Contributions do appear to decline in PVT with w = 65, which is
somewhat reassuring given that no contribution should occur in that case.
Only in CVT and PVT with w= 35 (where everyone should always contribute)
does behavior seem to approach BNE. Overall, only in these few simple cases,
where subjects should always or never contribute, do the data seem to suggest
learning patterns.
Figure VIII. Equilibrium Match Over Repeated Trials
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w=65 w=55 w=45 w=35
Variable OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
signal 1.026 0.002*** 1.033 0.000*** 1.028 0.013** 1.008 0.407
period 0.960 0.124 0.988 0.712 0.950 0.135 1.036 0.418
CVT 0.408 0.300 0.397 0.238 0.546 0.310 0.763 0.732
AT 0.709 0.717 0.667 0.588 0.405 0.148 0.180 0.019**
signal*CVT 1.007 0.528 1.001 0.941 1.000 0.978 1.004 0.781
signal*AT 0.981 0.096* 1.002 0.857 0.998 0.891 1.016 0.260
period*CVT 1.021 0.564 1.046 0.285 1.047 0.253 1.009 0.854
period*AT 1.094 0.102 0.975 0.581 1.043 0.330 1.001 0.984
Linear Combn OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
signal*(1+CVT) 1.033 0.000*** 1.033 0.000*** 1.027 0.003*** 1.012 0.299
signal*(1+AT) 1.007 0.389 1.034 0.000*** 1.026 0.000*** 1.024 0.016**
period*(1+CVT) 0.980 0.413 1.033 0.197 0.995 0.797 1.046 0.106
period*(1+AT) 1.050 0.310 0.963 0.237 0.991 0.738 1.037 0.171
AT-CVT 1.737 0.580 1.679 0.434 0.741 0.537 0.236 0.073*
signal*(AT-CVT) 0.974 0.018** 1.001 0.896 0.999 0.878 1.011 0.463
period*(AT-CVT) 1.071 0.202 0.932 0.084* 0.996 0.915 0.992 0.824
Table I. Logistic regression results. The dependent variable is an indicator
for contribution. Robust standard errors are clustered by individual subject.
Each regression has 690 observations with 138 subject-level clusters. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Figure VIII shows the proportion of choices consistent with several equi-
librium concepts over repeated trials. The particular partially-cursed equilib-
rium used here is for the maximum likelihood values of χ for CVT and AT (0.6
and 0.91 respectively).12 Again, there is little evidence of significant learn-
ing or convergence toward BNE, except in the simpler cases where subjects
should always or never contribute. The clearest differences in consistency of
contribution choices with the equilibrium concepts are in the cases of great-
est contrast between BNE and cursed cutoffs (CVT with w = 65 and AT with
w = 35). However, less differentiation is apparent for cost levels where there
is less contrast between cutoffs under each equilibrium concept.13
12Likelihood ratio tests confirm that the MLE partially-cursed equilibria fit the data signifi-
cantly better than BNE with p-value< 0.001 for both CVT and AT.
13Relatively few observations in these cases fall in the range where the equilibrium concepts
make different predictions.
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Table I shows logistic regression results, where the dependent variable is
an indicator for contribution to the group project.14 The omitted category for
the game indicators is PVT. The second panel of Table I shows linear combi-
nations of estimated effects, including the effect of signal and period in CVT
and AT, as well as differences between these treatments and effects. First,
it is clear that subjects do respond to signals when they should. Except in
CVT and PVT with w = 35 and AT with w = 65 (where either contribution or
non-contribution is always optimal), the signal effect is strongly significant.
Notice also that the effect of period of play is not significant for any game or
cost level. The one possible exception is the case of CVT with w = 35, where
the p-value approaches the 10% level. Finally, notice that the CVT indicator
and its interactions with signal and period are insignificant for all cost levels,
consistent with the previous finding from the aggregate results that behavior
in CVT and PVT is indistinguishable, despite stark differences in their BNE
strategies.
Overall, behavior over multiple periods of play shows little evidence of
learning, and confirms the strong similarity between strategies in CVT and
PVT. Result 3 summarizes the findings on repeated trials and learning.
Result 3 (Learning to play BNE). Subjects do not appear to learn to play
strategies closer to BNE, except possibly in some simpler cases where belief
conditioning effects are absent and equilibrium cutoffs are 0 or 100. Behavior
in CVT and PVT remains very similar, even after several periods of play.
Individual Heterogeneity
Individual subjects in CVT and AT may differ in their ability to properly con-
dition beliefs. I test whether cognitive and quantitative ability is correlated
with proper belief conditioning in CVT and AT (Hypothesis 4). The logistic re-
gression results in Tables II and III include as explanatory variables individ-
ual subjects’ college Grade Point Average (GPA) and an indicator for majoring
14I report the logistic regression results in terms of odds ratios the simplify the interpreta-
tion of interactions as multiplicative effects (Buis, 2010). However, computation of marginal
interaction effects using the method of Ai and Norton (2003) does not lead to substantively
different results.
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w=65 w=55 w=45 w=35
Variable OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
signal 1.034 0.001*** 1.032 0.000*** 1.025 0.000*** 1.005 0.744
period 0.974 0.397 1.014 0.733 0.985 0.562 1.004 0.885
GPA 0.405 0.151 0.867 0.740 1.462 0.223 3.125 0.072*
quant 0.478 0.111 0.656 0.335 1.070 0.824 1.318 0.634
Table II. Logistic regression results for CVT including GPA and quantita-
tive major indicator. The dependent variable is an indicator for contribution.
Robust standard errors are clustered by individual subject. Each regression
has 200 observations with 40 subject-level clusters. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
w=65 w=55 w=45 w=35
Variable OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
signal 1.007 0.360 1.035 0.000*** 1.026 0.000*** 1.025 0.016**
period 1.047 0.339 0.962 0.235 0.991 0.748 1.038 0.171
GPA 0.939 0.895 0.624 0.142 0.946 0.892 1.971 0.182
quant 0.420 0.058* 0.658 0.245 0.813 0.606 1.233 0.679
Table III. Logistic regression results for AT including GPA and quantitative
major indicator. The dependent variable is an indicator for contribution.
Robust standard errors are clustered by individual subject. Each regression
has 200 observations with 40 subject-level clusters. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
in a quantitative field. The majors I classify as quantitative are mathematics,
statistics, engineering, natural and physical sciences, computer science, eco-
nomics, finance, and accounting. The results in Table II show some evidence
of a positive correlation between GPA and contribution at cost level 35, but no
other such correlations are apparent. Table III shows similar logistic regres-
sion results for AT. Quantitative majors contribute less in AT for cost level 65,
but otherwise the results are again quite negative.15 Similar to the results on
learning over multiple rounds of play, the only apparent correlations here are
in treatments where the equilibrium strategy is simply to always contribute
or never contribute.
15The general negativity of these results is robust to alternative specifications including addi-
tional controls and interactions, as well as substituting ACT/SAT percentile in place of GPA.
While GPA is not available for all subjects, reducing the sample size somewhat, it is available
for more subjects than ACT/SAT scores.
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I next specify several candidate strategies to which individual choices are
compared. The candidate strategies include BNE and fully-cursed equilib-
rium, as well as several other possible heuristics: contributing iff w < 50
(“Prior”), contributing iff the signal exceeds w (“Signal Bias”), always con-
tributing, and never contributing.
I use a Bayesian approach to estimate the proportion of subjects in each
candidate strategy. I assume that each individual is playing one of the candi-
date strategies, but may make errors. In any individual game I assume that
with probability 1− ²i, player i follows her chosen strategy, and with prob-
ability ²i she deviates. First, an individual subject’s choices over all twenty
rounds are compared to the predictions of each candidate strategy. The error
rate ²i for player i is estimated as her smallest observed frequency of devia-
tions over all candidate strategies.16 So for example, if player i’s choices were
consistent with the fully-cursed strategy 95% of the time and less frequently
consistent with any other strategy, her estimated error rate would be 0.05.
Next, I set a uniform prior over all candidate strategies and update for each
observation according to Bayes’ rule to arrive at a posterior over the candidate
strategies for each individual subject. For each candidate strategy, the poste-
rior probability is averaged across subjects to estimate the overall proportion
of subjects playing that strategy.17
Table IV shows the estimated proportion of subjects playing each candidate
strategy in CVT and AT. In both games, the fully-cursed strategy is modal,
consistent with the aggregate results showing neglect of belief conditioning.
The BNE strategy is second most prevalent in CVT with a proportion of nearly
one quarter, though the vast majority appear to play some boundedly-rational
16There are very few subjects who are always consistent with a single candidate strategy, but
21.7% of subjects in CVT are at least 95% consistent. Among these subjects, just over half
closely match the fully-cursed strategy, while about one quarter closely match BNE. Only
7.5% of subjects in AT are at least 95% consistent.
17The results are reasonably robust to alternative error structures and non-uniform priors.
The MLE partially-cursed strategy is not included as a candidate strategy since it is a free
parameter estimated from the data rather than being specified a priori. However, if it is
included, it becomes modal in CVT and second most prevalent after the fully-cursed strategy
in AT, and the prevalence of BNE falls substantially.
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CVT AT
Strategy Proportion Std. Error Proportion Std. Error
Fully-Cursed 0.312 0.047 0.359 0.054
BNE 0.233 0.046 0.130 0.035
Prior 0.219 0.043 0.154 0.035
Signal Bias 0.120 0.034 0.187 0.044
Always 0.108 0.036 0.097 0.036
Never 0.008 0.003 0.073 0.036
Table IV. Estimated strategy proportions in CVT and AT
strategy. The BNE strategy is less prevalent in AT than CVT, which might
suggest that AT is a more difficult game.
To check for correlations between consistency with the BNE strategy from
the type estimation and cognitive/quantitative ability, I have run a number of
regressions similar to those in Tables II and III. However, the results have
been similarly negative, suggesting that some subjects’ behavior may sim-
ply appear to closely match BNE by chance rather than strategic sophistica-
tion.18 Furthermore, estimating strategy proportions in the PVT data using
the CVT strategies also yields an estimate of approximately one quarter of
subjects playing the BNE for the CVT game. However, the BNE strategy from
CVT does not have any particular justification or heuristic intuition in the
PVT game. Recall that the actual BNE strategy in PVT is identical to the
fully-cursed equilibrium strategy from CVT. Thus, there is no reason to ex-
pect subjects in PVT to play the BNE strategy from CVT, except perhaps by
chance. The similarity of estimated proportions in CVT and PVT playing the
BNE strategy from CVT further suggests that strategic sophistication does
not drive consistency with the BNE strategy in CVT. Therefore, it appears
that very few if any subjects are able to properly condition beliefs in this set-
ting.
Result 4 (Individual Heterogeneity and Cognitive/Quantitative Ability). There
is little evidence that behavior in CVT or AT is correlated with cognitive or
quantitative ability, except possibly in some simpler cases where conditioning
18This finding is similar to Georganas et al. (2012), who found very little correlation between
measures of cognitive ability and playing more sophisticated strategies in undercutting and
guessing games.
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effects are absent and the equilibrium cutoffs are 0 or 100. Estimated propor-
tions of strategic types show that fully-cursed behavior is modal, and that the
great majority of subjects play some boundedly-rational or heuristic strategy.
Over-Contribution in PVT
As shown in the previous results, there is a puzzling tendency for subjects to
over-contribute in PVT (and AT) with w = 65. Even with a signal of 100, the
expected value of the group project is no greater than 60 tokens, and thus sub-
jects should never contribute in PVT when the cost is 65 tokens. Interestingly,
subjects do not frequently make similar mistakes in PVT with w= 35, where
contribution is always optimal for any signal. Thus, there is an asymmetry in
behavior between cases in which subjects should always or never contribute.
This finding is not driven by a small subset of subjects. Rather, a majority
of subjects contributed at least once in this case. This behavior is clearly
not driven by cursedness, because in PVT full or partial cursedness yields the
same prediction as BNE. Rationalizing this behavior through risk preferences
would require many subjects to be implausibly risk-loving, with coefficients
of relative risk aversion less than −5. This behavior might represent some
form of altruism, as subjects may simply view contributing as a pro-social
act. However, such motivations would be misguided, since the group project
is a bad bet for other players as well. Furthermore, this explanation is less
appealing in AT, in which allocating tokens to the group project may prevent
it from being provided.
Another possibility is that subjects are simply bad at calculating expected
values. To investigate this possibility, a surprise bonus question was added
at the end of the second session of PVT and the second session of AT. In this
question, subjects were asked to calculate the expected value of the group
project given a signal of 100. Answers within plus or minus 5 of the correct
answer (60) were rewarded with a $1 bonus payment on top of any earnings
from the main part of the experiment. If subjects can correctly perform this
calculation, they should see that contributing at a cost of 65 is never optimal.
Of the forty subjects in these two sessions, 45% got the answer exactly
right (which was also the modal response), and 65% answered within plus
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Variable OR p-value
signal 1.058 0.001***
period 0.923 0.086*
AT 1.756 0.838
signal*AT 0.950 0.008***
period*AT 1.129 0.097*
correct 0.575 0.423
GPA 0.902 0.837
quant 0.596 0.443
correct*AT 2.648 0.359
GPA*AT 1.227 0.777
quant*AT 0.934 0.946
Linear Combn OR p-value
correct*(1+AT) 1.524 0.602
GPA*(1+AT) 1.106 0.845
quant*(1+AT) 0.557 0.441
Table V. Logistic regression results for bonus question, with contribution
indicator at cost level 65 as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the individual subject level. There are 200 observations and
40 subject-level clusters. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
or minus 5. Table V shows logistic regression results for contribution at cost
level w= 65 in these two sessions, using an indicator (“correct”) for an exactly
correct answer as an explanatory variable. Answering the bonus question
correctly does not appear to be correlated with over-contributing in either PVT
or AT.19 Similarly, over-contribution does not appear to be correlated with
GPA or quantitative major. Thus, errors in expected value calculation do not
appear to be an important reason for the observed over-contribution.
Another possible explanation is that incentives are weak in PVT with w=
65, since the probability of provision of the group project is small in this case.
To investigate this explanation, I ran two additional sessions of a modified
19These negative results are robust to alternative specifications, including using an indicator
for an answer with plus or minus 5, or using the actual reported expected value, as well as
dropping GPA and quant.
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Figure IX. Contribution in PVT v. PVTk1
version of PVT with k = 1, which I call PVTk1.20 This treatment reduces
PVT from a game to an individual choice problem, since with a threshold of 1
contributor, no player’s choice can affect any other player’s payoff.21 Changing
k does not alter the optimal strategies in this case: the predicted cutoffs are
the same as the BNE cutoffs in the PVT game and the fully-cursed cutoffs
in the CVT game. However, turning the PVT game into an individual choice
problem steepens incentives, since every player is always pivotal in this case.
Figure IX compares contribution in PVT and PVTk1 for contribution costs
of 55 and 65. Contribution is significantly lower in PVTk1 than in PVT for
w = 65, though over-contribution is not eliminated.22 There is no apparent
difference for w= 55 or lower costs of contribution (not shown).
20The first session of PVTk1 had only 15 subjects due to absences, while the second session
had 20 subjects.
21Subjects were still matched into groups of five and given feedback on other group members
choices, to keep framing and potential imitation learning effects constant.
22A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test using the subject-level average contribution as the unit
observation shows this difference to be significant with p-value=0.0228.
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Overall, the results in this subsection suggest that over-contribution in
PVT with w= 65 are partially driven by weak incentives due to the low proba-
bility of provision. Mistakes in expected value calculation do not appear to be
a significant factor. Even in the individual choice problem of PVTk1, subjects
still choose the group project too often for w= 65. It is possible that some sub-
jects simply enjoy gambling in small amounts, or use idiosyncratic heuristics
leading to over-contribution in this case.
VI DISCUSSION
In this paper, I have demonstrated that a severe neglect of belief condition-
ing can lead to under-contribution and thus under-provision of common-value
excludable public goods. In the CVT game, a favorable conditioning effect
arises in Bayesian Nash equilibrium because the expected value of the public
good conditional on sufficiently many others contributing is higher than this
expectation conditional on the private signal alone. However, experimental
subjects fail to account for this effect, consistent with the cursed equilibrium
model of Eyster and Rabin (2005). Furthermore, behavior in this game is
indistinguishable from behavior in the closely-related PVT game, in which
conditioning effects are absent. There is also a surprising similarity in behav-
ior between the CVT game (with a favorable conditioning effect) and the AT
game (with an unfavorable conditioning effect). The fully-cursed equilibria
of CVT, PVT, and AT are identical, while there are sharp differences in their
Bayesian Nash equilibria. Thus, the similarity in behavior between games is
consistent with cursedness. Furthermore, there is little evidence of learning
across multiple rounds of play with feedback in any of the three games, and
neither cognitive nor quantitative ability appears to mitigate the failure to
properly condition beliefs.
However, the level of contribution in PVT with the highest contribution cost
is unexplained by cursed equilibrium or BNE. The decrease in contribution
in PVTk1 (the individual-choice version of PVT) suggests that flat incentives
partially drive contribution in this case, since the probability of provision is
low. Such flatness of incentives is also present in CVT with the highest con-
tribution cost, and may have also driven some contributions in this case. If
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so, the degree of cursedness in CVT may actually be underestimated, since
higher degrees of cursedness lead to less contribution.
While contribution for the highest cost level is significantly lower in PVTk1
than in PVT, it is not eliminated. One possible conjecture to explain this
behavior is that some subjects may simply enjoy gambling in small amounts.
This conjecture is also consistent with the asymmetry in behavior for cost
levels 35 and 65, with over-contribution at cost level 65 but no substantial
under-contribution at cost level 35.
This paper contributes to the the literature on public goods by identifying a
novel source of under-contribution distinct from free-riding. While this exper-
iment is designed to provide a clear separation between equilibrium and naïve
contribution choices and not to closely parallel any particular real-world set-
ting, the behavioral phenomenon found here may also be important in more
realistic environments. In a number of applications within public economics
and industrial organization, such as the provision of gated communities and
the formation of joint ventures, naïve contribution choices may cause a failure
to coordinate on efficiency-enhancing outcomes. Future research might exam-
ine the design of optimal mechanisms for information aggregation in such
environments. In the simple case that I consider, the incentives of individual
agents are aligned under pure common value, so that agents would truth-
fully reveal their signals if they could. However, this is not necessarily true
in closely related cases in which some form a free-riding is possible. Private
value components, unequal contributions, or lack of excludability all lead to
the possibility of free-riding in some form, which may give individual players
an incentive to misrepresent their private information.
This paper also contributes to the literature on cursedness in related con-
texts such as common-value auctions and voting games by examining cursed
equilibrium in a novel game and showing a potentially important consequence
of this type of bounded rationality. Importantly, my experimental design
demonstrates the failure to properly condition beliefs by the comparison of
the CVT and PVT treatments. While comparing behavior to theoretical bench-
marks within a treatment is also useful, the treatment comparison controls
for other potential sources of decision error while varying only the presence of
CURSED BELIEFS WITH COMMON-VALUE PUBLIC GOODS 33
belief conditioning effects. The treatment comparison suggests that subjects
not only fail to fully condition beliefs, but actually fail to condition at all.
I have focused on the case of excludable public goods (such as gated com-
munities and private parks) to isolate under-contribution due to the neglect
of belief conditioning in the absence of free-riding incentives. Future research
might explore the idea of pure public goods with interdependent values.23 Ex-
amples include pollution abatement and flood control, for which values are
likely to be strongly correlated, but uncertain. This study provides a first step
toward a promising line of inquiry on coordination and information aggrega-
tion in environments with common-value public goods.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. In symmetric BNE, agents contribute with equal probabil-
ity p=Pr(c(X )= 1). Given a signal xi, agent i’s expected payoff of contributing
is given by:
Ui(xi)=
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1
l
)
pl(1− p)n−1−l
(
αxi+ (1−α)ln−1 E[X |c(X )= 1]+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1 E[X |c(X )= 0]−w
)
(10)
Differentiating with respect to the xi, it is straightforward to verify that
agent i’s expected payoff is non-decreasing in xi, and is strictly increasing
whenever p> 0.
Suppose in symmetric BNE, {xi ∈ [x, x] | Ui(xi) > 0} = ;. Then simply let
x∗i = x+1. Next, suppose in symmetric BNE, {xi ∈ [x, x] | Ui(xi) > 0} = [x, x].
Then let x∗i = x−1. Now suppose in symmetric BNE, {xi ∈ [x, x] |Ui(xi)> 0} is a
non-empty, proper subset of [x, x]. Take xi ∈ {xi ∈ [x, x] |Ui(xi)> 0}. Then since
the expected payoff of contributing is non-decreasing in the signal, whenever
x′i > xi, it must be that Ui(x′i) ≥ Ui(xi) > 0. Since {xi ∈ [x, x] | Ui(xi) > 0} is
bounded below by x, it has an infimum. Let x∗i = inf {xi ∈ [x, x] |Ui(xi)> 0}. By
continuity, Ui(x∗i )= 0. By symmetry x∗i = x∗ for each agent i ∈N.
Given a signal x′′i ≤ x∗, it must be that Ui(x′′i ) ≤ 0, by definition of x∗ and
continuity of Ui. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Take r 6= i. Then:
E
[
Xr
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c∗(X j)≥ k−1
]
=Pr
( ∑
j 6=i
c∗(X j)− c∗(Xr)< k−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c∗(X j)≥ k−1
)
E[Xr|Xr ≥ x∗]
+Pr
( ∑
j 6=i
c∗(X j)− c∗(Xr)≥ k−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c∗(X j)≥ k−1
)
E[Xr]
(11)
Intuitively, it is possible to partition the event where at least k−1 signals
other than xi exceed x∗ into two cases. In the first, exactly k−1 signals other
than xi exceed x∗, one of which is xr. In the second case, at least k−1 signals
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other than xi and xr exceed x∗, in which case the expectation of Xr is simply
the prior expectation.
As x∗ increases, E[Xr|Xr ≥ x∗] weakly increases by first-order stochastic
dominance. In particular, E[Xr|Xr ≥ x∗] ≥ E[Xr]. Since the expression in
equation 11 is a convex combination of these two expectations, it suffices to
show that the first probability in equation 11 is also non-decreasing in x∗.
Pr
( ∑
j 6=i
c∗(X j)− c∗(Xr)< k−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c∗(X j)≥ k−1
)
= (
n−2
k−2)(1−F(x∗))k−1F(x∗)n−k
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
= (
n−2
k−2)
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )
(
1−F(x∗)
F(x∗)
)l−k+1
(12)
It is straightforward to verify that 1−F(x
∗)
F(x∗) is non-increasing in x
∗, which
implies that the probability in equation 12 is non-decreasing in x∗. Thus the
expectation in equation 11 is non-decreasing in x∗, which implies the result.

Proof of Proposition 1. Let w belong to the given interval. First, this interval
is non-empty since:(
α+ (1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+ (1−α)(n−k)n−1 E[X ]−αx− (1−α)E[X ]
=α(x− x)+ (1−α)(k−1)n−1 (x−E[X ])> 0
(13)
Note also that the given interval is contained in [x, x] since the lower bound
is a convex combination of x and E[X ] while the upper bound is a convex
combination of x and E[X ].
Restricting to x∗ < x, equation 4 can be rewritten as H(x∗)= 0 where:
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H(x∗)=
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
(
αx∗+ (1−α)ln−1 E[X |X≥x∗]+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1 E[X |X<x∗]−w
)
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
=αx∗−w+
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
(
(1−α)l
n−1 E[X |X≥x∗]+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1 E[X |X<x∗]
)
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
=αx∗−w+ (1−α)G i(x∗)
(14)
Intuitively, H(x∗) is the expected utility of contributing given a signal of
x∗ conditional on the public good being provided, where each other agents’
strategy is contribution whenever their signal is at least x∗.
Notice that H(x∗) is strictly increasing in x∗ because the final term is non-
decreasing in x∗ by 2. Thus, H(x∗) can cross zero at most once, guaranteeing
that there is at most one interior equilibrium cutoff.
Consider the behavior of H(x∗) as x∗→ x. The key term of interest is the
probability that exactly k− 1 agents other than i contributed given that at
least k−1 contributed.
lim
x∗→x
Pr
( ∑
j 6=i
c(X j)= k−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j 6=i c(X j)≥ k−1
)
= lim
x∗→x
(n−1k−1)(1−F(x∗))k−1F(x∗)n−k
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗))lF(x∗)n−1−l
= lim
x∗→x
1
1+
n−1∑
l=k
(k−1)!(n−k)!
l!(n−1−l)!
(
1−F(x∗)
F(x∗)
)l−k+1 = 1
(15)
Since lim
x∗→x
1−F(x∗)
F(x∗) = 0. Therefore, taking the limit of H(x∗) as x∗→ x yields
the following:
lim
x∗→x
H(x∗)=αx−w+ (1−α)(k−1)
n−1 x+
(1−α)(n−k)
n−1 E[X ] (16)
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Which is positive if and only if w <
(
α+ (1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+ (1−α)(n−k)n−1 E[X ]. Now
consider x∗ = x.
H(x)=αx−w+ (1−α)E[X ] (17)
The right-hand side is negative if and only if w > αx+ (1−α)E[X ]. Thus,
since H(x∗) is clearly continuous, there exists x∗ ∈ (x, x) such that H(x∗) = 0,
thus satisfying equation 4.
Now suppose w is not within the specified bounds. Since H(x∗) is strictly in-
creasing in x∗, it is either positive everywhere or negative everywhere. Thus,
no symmetric BNE cutoff exists.

Proof of Corollary 1. H(x∗) in equation 14 is clearly decreasing in w. There-
fore, when w increases, H becomes negative at the previous value of x∗. Since
H is increasing in x∗, the value of x∗ at which this function is zero must be
higher. Similarly, G i(x∗) in equation 2 is clearly increasing in k, which implies
that H(x∗) is also increasing in k. Therefore, when k increases, the value of
x∗ at which H(x∗)= 0 must decrease.

Proof of Proposition 2. As in Lemma 1, in symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium,
the expected utility of contributing is non-decreasing in the signal. Thus by
the same argument as in Lemma 1, attention can be restricted to cutoff equi-
libria. The equilibrium condition in equation 4 becomes:
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1
l
)
(1−F(x∗χ))lF(x∗χ)n−1−l
[
αx∗χ+ (1−α)ln−1
(
χE[X ]+ (1−χ)E[X |X ≥ x∗χ]
)
+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1
(
χE[X ]+ (1−χ)E[X |X < x∗χ]
)
−w
]
= 0
(18)
As in the proof of Proposition 1, define a function Hχ(x∗χ) as follows:
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Hχ(x∗χ)=
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗χ))l F(x∗χ)n−1−l
[
αx∗χ+ (1−α)ln−1
(
χE[X ]+(1−χ)E[X |X≥x∗χ]
)
+ (1−α)(n−1−l)n−1
(
χE[X ]+(1−χ)E[X |X<x∗χ]
)
−w
]
n−1∑
l=k−1
(n−1l )(1−F(x∗χ))l F(x∗χ)n−1−l
=αx∗χ−w+ (1−α)χE[X ]+ (1−α)(1−χ)G i(x∗χ)
(19)
As in Proposition 1, a zero of this function in (x, x) corresponds to an inte-
rior symmetric equilibrium cutoff. As in Proposition 1, it can be shown that
limx∗χ→x Hχ(x
∗
χ)> 0 and Hχ(x)< 0 given the bounds on w. Thus, by continuity,
an interior zero exists. By Lemma 2, Hχ(x∗χ) is strictly increasing in x∗χ, and
so it has at most one zero. Furthermore, as in Proposition 1, if w lies outside
the given interval, Hχ(x∗χ) has no interior zero.
For χ= 1 (fully-cursed equilibrium), equation 18 becomes:
(
αx∗1 + (1−α)E[X ]−w
) n−1∑
l=k−1
(
n−1
l
)
(1−F(x∗1 ))lF(x∗1 )n−1−l = 0 (20)
If x∗1 < x, then solving for the cutoff yields equation 7.

Proof of Corollary 2. From equation 19 it is clear that Hχ is non-increasing in
χ, since by Lemma 2, G i(x∗χ)≥G i(x)= E[X ]. Thus, as χ increases, the zero of
Hχ (weakly) increases. The proof of the comparative statics with respect to w
and k is the same as the proof of1

Proof of Corollary 3. The bounds on w in Propositions 1 and 2 imply the re-
sult, as long as:
(
α+ (1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x+ (1−α)(n−k)n−1 E[X ]−
(
α+ (1−χ)(1−α)(k−1)n−1
)
x−
(
χ(1−α)(k−1)
n−1 + (1−α)(n−k)n−1
)
E[X ]
= χ(1−α)(k−1)n−1 (x−E[X ])> 0
(21)
Which holds if α< 1. 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Experiment Overview
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. In this experiment
you will make a series of choices, each of which may earn you money. The
amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions you make and on the
decisions of others. If you listen carefully and make good decisions, you could
earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the
end of the experiment.
Ground Rules
Please make all decisions independently; do not communicate with others (in
the room or outside the room) in any way during the experiment. This means
no talking, no cell phone usage, no texting, no internet chatting, etc. Please do
not attempt to use any software other than the experiment software provided.
Failure to comply with these rules will lead to dismissal from the experiment.
Instructions (CVT)
During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid
based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 20 cents, or $1
for every 5 tokens.
The experiment consists of twenty rounds. At the start of the first round,
you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of five. At the
start of each later round, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched
into new groups of five, so that your group changes every round and you never
learn the identities of the other group members in any round.
In each round, you will choose how to allocate some number of tokens,
which we will call T. Everyone in your group in any given round will allocate
the same number of tokens, so that T is the same for everyone in your group
and is known to everyone in your group. However, T may change from round
to round.
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The T tokens may be allocated to a private account or to a group project.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens
for the round. The details of the group project are as follows.
In each round, a random number will be selected by the computer from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 100. We will call this random number
your signal. Each other member of your group will also get a signal randomly
selected by the computer from the same distribution. We will call the signals
of the five group members S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5. All signals are drawn
independently. During each round, you will not observe the signals of the
other members. Similarly, other members of the group will not observe any
signal other than their own.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, and if at least three
other members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get a number of tokens equal to the average of the signals of
all five members of your group for the round. We will call the average of the
signals of the five members of your group the value of the group project, or V ,
which is given by:
V = S1+S2+S3+S4+S5
5
So, for example, if your signal is 50 and the other members of your group
get signals of 25, 40, 62, and 86, then the average of all five signals is:
V = 50+25+40+62+86
5
= 52.6
Thus, in this case, if you chose to allocate T tokens to the group project and
at least three other members of your group also chose to allocate T tokens to
the group project, then you would get 52.6 tokens for that round.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but less than three
other members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get T tokens for that round. In other words, if less than
four of the five members of your group (including yourself) choose to allocate
T tokens to the group project, then all tokens are automatically reallocated to
private accounts and everyone in your group gets T tokens.
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After all members of your group have made their choice, you will learn the
value of the group project (V ) and your earnings in tokens for the round. You
will also learn the signals observed by the other members of your group (listed
from highest to lowest) and how they allocated T tokens (to the group project
or private account).
The following summarizes your choice in each round. If you choose to al-
locate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens. If you choose to
allocate T tokens to the group project, and if at least three other members
of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, then you
get V tokens, where V is the average of the signals of the five members of
your group. If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but less
than three other members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to
the group project, then you get T tokens.
Remember that you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into
new groups of five at the start of each round. Also remember that T is the
same for every member of your group. However, signals are randomly and
independently drawn for each member of your group.
Of the twenty rounds, one will be randomly selected for payment. All
participants will be paid their earnings in dollars for the randomly selected
round, plus a $5.00 show-up payment. You will not find out which round you
will be paid for until the end of the experiment, so you should treat each round
as something for which you might get paid. You will not be paid for the rounds
that are not randomly selected for payment.
Are there any questions before we begin the experiment?
Instructions (AT)
During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid
based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 20 cents, or $1
for every 5 tokens.
The experiment consists of twenty rounds. At the start of the first round,
you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of five. At the
start of each later round, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched
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into new groups of five, so that your group changes every round and you never
learn the identities of the other group members in any round.
In each round, you will choose how to allocate some number of tokens,
which we will call T. Everyone in your group in any given round will allocate
the same number of tokens, so that T is the same for everyone in your group
and is known to everyone in your group. However, T may change from round
to round.
The T tokens may be allocated to a private account or to a group project.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens
for the round. The details of the group project are as follows.
In each round, a random number will be selected by the computer from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 100. We will call this random number
your signal. Each other member of your group will also get a signal randomly
selected by the computer from the same distribution. We will call the signals
of the five group members S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5. All signals are drawn
independently. During each round, you will not observe the signals of the
other members. Similarly, other members of the group will not observe any
signal other than their own.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, and if no more than
one other member of your group also chooses to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get a number of tokens equal to the average of the signals of
all five members of your group for the round. We will call the average of the
signals of the five members of your group the value of the group project, or V ,
which is given by:
V = S1+S2+S3+S4+S5
5
So, for example, if your signal is 50 and the other members of your group
get signals of 25, 40, 62, and 86, then the average of all five signals is:
V = 50+25+40+62+86
5
= 52.6
Thus, in this case, if you chose to allocate T tokens to the group project
and if no more than one other member of your group also chose to allocate T
tokens to the group project, then you would get 52.6 tokens for that round.
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If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but more than one
other member of your group also chooses to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get T tokens for that round. In other words, if more than
two of the five members of your group (including yourself) choose to allocate
T tokens to the group project, then all tokens are automatically reallocated to
private accounts and everyone in your group gets T tokens.
After all members of your group have made their choice, you will learn the
value of the group project (V ) and your earnings in tokens for the round. You
will also learn the signals observed by the other members of your group (listed
from highest to lowest) and how they allocated T tokens (to the group project
or private account).
The following summarizes your choice in each round. If you choose to al-
locate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens. If you choose to
allocate T tokens to the group project, and if no more than one other member
of your group also chooses to allocate T tokens to the group project, then you
get V tokens, where V is the average of the signals of the five members of
your group. If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but more
than one other member of your group also chooses to allocate T tokens to the
group project, then you get T tokens.
Remember that you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into
new groups of five at the start of each round. Also remember that T is the
same for every member of your group. However, signals are randomly and
independently drawn for each member of your group.
Of the twenty rounds, one will be randomly selected for payment. All
participants will be paid their earnings in dollars for the randomly selected
round, plus a $5.00 show-up payment. You will not find out which round you
will be paid for until the end of the experiment, so you should treat each round
as something for which you might get paid. You will not be paid for the rounds
that are not randomly selected for payment.
Are there any questions before we begin the experiment?
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Instructions (PVT)
During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid
based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 20 cents, or $1
for every 5 tokens.
The experiment consists of twenty rounds. At the start of the first round,
you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of five. At the
start of each later round, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched
into new groups of five, so that your group changes every round and you never
learn the identities of the other group members in any round.
In each round, you will choose how to allocate some number of tokens,
which we will call T. Everyone in your group in any given round will allocate
the same number of tokens, so that T is the same for everyone in your group
and is known to everyone in your group. However, T may change from round
to round.
The T tokens may be allocated to a private account or to a group project.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens
for the round. The details of the group project are as follows.
In each round, a random number will be selected by the computer from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 100. We will call this random number
your signal and label it S. Each other member of your group will also get
a signal randomly selected by the computer from the same distribution. All
signals are drawn independently. During each round, you will not observe the
signals of the other members. Similarly, other members of the group will not
observe any signal other than their own.
Furthermore, in each round, four unobserved random number will be se-
lected for you by the computer from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100.
We will label these four random numbers R1, R2, R3, and R4. For each other
member of your group, there will also be four unobserved numbers randomly
selected by the computer from the same distribution. All of these random
numbers are drawn independently of each other and independently of your
signal and the signals of others in your group. You will not observe any of
these random numbers, and neither will any other member of your group.
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If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, and if at least three
other members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get a number of tokens equal to the average of your signal
and the four unobserved random numbers selected for you by the computer
for the round. We will call this average your value for the group project, or V ,
which is given by:
V = S+R1+R2+R3+R4
5
So, for example, if your signal is 50 and the four unobserved random num-
bers are 25, 40, 62, and 86, then the average is:
V = 50+25+40+62+86
5
= 52.6
Thus, in this case, if you chose to allocate T tokens to the group project and
at least three other members of your group also chose to allocate T tokens to
the group project, then you would get 52.6 tokens for that round.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but less than three
other members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group
project, then you get T tokens for that round. In other words, if less than
four of the five members of your group (including yourself) choose to allocate
T tokens to the group project, then all tokens are automatically reallocated to
private accounts and everyone in your group gets T tokens.
After all members of your group have made their choice, you will learn your
value for the group project (V ) and your earnings in tokens for the round. You
will also learn the signals observed by the other members of your group (listed
from highest to lowest) and how they allocated T tokens (to the group project
or private account).
The following summarizes your choice in each round. If you choose to al-
locate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens. If you choose to
allocate T tokens to the group project, and if at least three other members
of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, then you
get V tokens, where V is the average of your signal, R1, R2, R3, and R4. If
you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, but less than three other
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members of your group also choose to allocate T tokens to the group project,
then you get T tokens.
Remember that you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into
new groups of five at the start of each round. Also remember that T is the
same for every member of your group. However, signals and unobserved ran-
dom numbers are randomly and independently drawn for each member of
your group.
Of the twenty rounds, one will be randomly selected for payment. All
participants will be paid their earnings in dollars for the randomly selected
round, plus a $5.00 show-up payment. You will not find out which round you
will be paid for until the end of the experiment, so you should treat each round
as something for which you might get paid. You will not be paid for the rounds
that are not randomly selected for payment.
Are there any questions before we begin the experiment?
Instructions (PVTk1)
During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid
based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 20 cents, or $1
for every 5 tokens.
The experiment consists of twenty rounds. At the start of the first round,
you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of five. At the
start of each later round, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched
into new groups of five, so that your group changes every round and you never
learn the identities of the other group members in any round.
In each round, you will choose how to allocate some number of tokens,
which we will call T. Everyone in your group in any given round will allocate
the same number of tokens, so that T is the same for everyone in your group
and is known to everyone in your group. However, T may change from round
to round.
The T tokens may be allocated to a private account or to a group project.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens
for the round. The details of the group project are as follows.
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In each round, a random number will be selected by the computer from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 100. We will call this random number
your signal and label it S. Each other member of your group will also get
a signal randomly selected by the computer from the same distribution. All
signals are drawn independently. During each round, you will not observe the
signals of the other members. Similarly, other members of the group will not
observe any signal other than their own.
Furthermore, in each round, four unobserved random numbers will be se-
lected for you by the computer from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100.
We will label these four random numbers R1, R2, R3, and R4. For each other
member of your group, there will also be four unobserved numbers randomly
selected by the computer from the same distribution. All of these random
numbers are drawn independently of each other and independently of your
signal and the signals of others in your group. You will not observe any of
these random numbers, and neither will any other member of your group.
If you choose to allocate T tokens to the group project, then you get a num-
ber of tokens equal to the average of your signal and the four unobserved
random numbers selected for you by the computer for the round. We will call
this average your value for the group project, or V , which is given by:
V = S+R1+R2+R3+R4
5
So, for example, if your signal is 50 and the four unobserved random num-
bers are 25, 40, 62, and 86, then the average is:
V = 50+25+40+62+86
5
= 52.6
Thus, in this case, if you chose to allocate T tokens to the group project,
then you would get 52.6 tokens for that round.
After all members of your group have made their choice, you will learn your
value for the group project (V ) and your earnings in tokens for the round. You
will also learn the signals observed by the other members of your group (listed
from highest to lowest) and how they allocated T tokens (to the group project
or private account).
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The following summarizes your choice in each round. If you choose to al-
locate T tokens to a private account, then you get T tokens. If you choose to
allocate T tokens to the group project, then you get V tokens, where V is the
average of your signal, R1, R2, R3, and R4.
Remember that you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into
new groups of five at the start of each round. Also remember that T is the
same for every member of your group. However, signals and unobserved ran-
dom numbers are randomly and independently drawn for each member of
your group.
Of the twenty rounds, one will be randomly selected for payment. All
participants will be paid their earnings in dollars for the randomly selected
round, plus a $5.00 show-up payment. You will not find out which round you
will be paid for until the end of the experiment, so you should treat each round
as something for which you might get paid. You will not be paid for the rounds
that are not randomly selected for payment.
Are there any questions before we begin the experiment?
